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Abstract 
This essay explores the issue of drug trafficking and production in Myanmar to understand 
the extent of damage this problematic situation has on the South East Asian region and to 
discuss what steps are being taken by institutions to stem the proliferation of narcotics such 
as heroin and amphetamines. Myanmar’s turbulent political history and unique geographical 
position have been explained to garner knowledge on why drug trafficking and production 
are so closely associated with the nation. The policymaking efforts of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to combat drug trafficking and production in the region 
have so far been plagued by obstructions such as internal corruption, a lack of multilateral 
cooperation and insufficient resources. These barriers combine to create policy that it is 
aligned closer to empty rhetoric than actual physical implementation. The ASEAN and China 
Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) agreement has shown 
signs of a changing tide toward effective policymaking, due mainly to China stepping up to 
the plate of regional leadership. This essay recommends that in order to successfully fight 
drug trafficking and production, ASEAN need to establish more realistic and achievable 
goals with an emphasis on rehabilitation rather than punishment. Furthermore, compliance 
mechanisms should be put in place by ASEAN so that countries such as Myanmar, who often 
deviate from the status quo of drug policy, will be reprimanded for doing so in the future. 
Thus, creating an environment of multilateral cooperation, togetherness and consistency in 
relation to combatting the illegal drug trafficking and production trade.   
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The golden triangle is one of the world’s premier opium and methamphetamine 
trafficking destinations; Myanmar dominates the production and trafficking of opiates and is 
heavily involved in the production and trafficking of Amphetamine Type Substances 
(hereafter ATS). Myanmar faces an inability to adequately curtail drug production due to a 
myriad of political and social factors and this is only further problematic in light of selective 
policing policies against drug users and inefficiency in seizures and poppy eradication. The 
drug trade is inexorably tied to the geopolitical realities of the region and everything from 
regional to international (Sino-US) strategic considerations both limit progress to and prolong 
the mechanisms of drug production. ASEAN as the premier regional grouping which has 
made itself committed to curtailing drug production in the region since 1976 has faced 
consistent shortcomings due to the predominately rhetorical nature of its attempts to bind 
states together to attack the problem. Internal corruption and a lack of resources is also a 
significant roadblock facing the prospect of ASEAN’s ability to push forward meaningful 
legislative action towards curtailing the production and trafficking of drugs within the golden 
triangle. 
The golden triangle is a 150,000 square mile mountainous region which is home to 
Myanmar, Thailand and Laos. The proliferation of drug production and trafficking over the 
golden triangle, especially in regards to the production of heroin and methamphetamines can 
be attributed, at least somewhat largely to the state of Myanmar. Myanmar is the world’s 
second largest producer of heroin behind Afghanistan and accounted for 92 per cent of the 
golden triangles production at the turn of the 21st century (Chalk; 2000, P.92) and is heavily 
involved in the production and trafficking of methamphetamine. In ‘Methods of madness: 
Methamphetamines and the Golden Triangle’, Lintner and Black argue the political problems 
and ethnic conflicts in Myanmar for the rise of amphetamine production and distribution 
(Lintner and Black; 2009). A large portion of the heroin that is transported from the golden 
triangle goes through the Myanmar-Thailand border; Thailand shares a 2,400 km border with 
Myanmar which is porous and largely demarcated which leads to insufficiency in attempts to 
supress drug movement (Emmers; 2007, P. 511). As opium cultivation has become more 
controlled in the Golden Triangle (minus Myanmar), Chris Lytelleton argues that ATS 
(amphetamine type stimulants) have become the “drug of choice” for producers and 
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traffickers in Northern Thailand, North-western Laos and North-eastern Myanmar (Lyttleton; 
2004, P. 910). 
Chin argues that the drug trade is “an important part of the politics of Southeast 
Asia”; it is important to underscore the geopolitical considerations which allow the 
trafficking of narcotics from Myanmar across the golden triangle to remain relatively 
unpatrolled to move towards solutions for its eradication.  The Burmese government is 
intrinsically involved in the production of heroin within in its borders; so too, high ranking 
military officials are said to be heavily involved in the methamphetamine business (Ball; 
1999, P.6). There are very few channels for high streamline profits within the country and its 
allowance of production of heroin in the Wa state, for example, is met with strategic 
considerations; the Wa state is left alone to traffic and produce drugs not only because 
economically it serves the Myanmar state but it also allows the government to focus on other 
numerous contending political forces. Other strategic considerations can be argued to come 
from the Importance of the Wa state as a buffer state against Thai armed forces which pleases 
the Myanmar government having a pacified and highly armed state between Yangon and its 
neighbours. Chin argues that in “the long history of animosities” between Myanmar and 
Thailand, the Wa and the Shan were often used as “buffers” during hostilities and their 
actions over or underplayed by the governments to achieve political goals (Ibid; P. 235). 
The realities of drug production in Myanmar have much to do with the political 
situation; the post 1962 state, dominated by the Tatmadaw military Junta, has been far from a 
pluralistic society which has an ever evolving civil war with minority ethnic groups and the 
absence of concrete rule of law which leaves “continuous strife” and the heroin flowing 
(Lintner; 1994, P. 331-335). Ongoing political conflicts exacerbate the already thin reach of 
the government to provide adequate social services such as drug prevention and education 
programmes, along with health care and aid to village groups such as the Wa who rely on 
drug production for state building and lifelines. So too the ability of the Myanmar 
government to deal with ongoing political conflicts, maintain legitimacy and establish 
adequate rule of law leaves them little resources or want to deal with what remains a lucrative 
venture for the state apparatus. Whilst looking at the internal systematic factors that lead to 
the accommodation of drug producers and traffickers within Myanmar, it is important to note 
the role of China, Thailand, the importance of its economic openings under Deng Xiaoping 
and Sino-US relations. 
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China’s opening of their doors to trade after the coup that ended the power of the 
Gang of Four was an enabler to the drug trade through Deng’s speech acts encouraging 
acquisition of wealth through China’s open door policy. After China withdrew its support 
from the Burmese communist party, many Wa leaders took to distancing themselves from the 
communist party and developing their societies through the drug trade (Lintner; 1990). 
Thailand’s linkages with Myanmar, more specifically Northern Thailand, alongside the 
Yunnan province in China bare special mention in the proliferation of heroin and 
amphetamines from the Wa state due to their close economic, social and cultural connections 
with the heavy production regions of the Wa area. Myanmar is also one of the only South 
East Asian states that is not aligned with Washington and instead has cordial relations with 
Beijing; this is a limitation that can be argued to make Beijing reticent to come down harshly 
upon the exchanges between the Wa, Shan etc. and the Yunnan provinces in fear of losing a 
valuable regional ally. 
To grasp the scope of Myanmar’s drug related issues, it is valuable to analyse how the 
adoption of repressive and harsh drug policies have impacted its society. Currently, the law, 
based primarily on the 1993 Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Law, criminalises 
drug use, possession, cultivation, production, and trafficking (Kramer; 2007, P.13). Yet it 
also imposes penalties on drug users who fail to register themselves as such; many have been 
prosecuted under this law (Section 15) (ibid; 2007, P.13). This has led to a disturbing 
situation whereby many drug users have been jailed for minor offences whilst others who 
remain free fear that drug rehabilitation programs are merely a guise to conviction. Thus, 
Myanmar faces an unfortunate juxtaposition of overpopulated prisons and underpopulated, 
ineffectual rehabilitation facilities (ibid; 2007, P.14). It is appropriate to note that when 
addressing an issue such as illicit drugs, empirical analysis can be rather difficult. As 
respondents who have the most information are often unwilling to provide it due to personal 
security concerns, especially in Myanmar, whereby freedom of speech regarding personal 
drug use has often led to incarceration (Su; 2015, P.73). With regard to drug trafficking for 
example, Myanmar statistically has a very low rate of seizure which does not reflect its status 
as South East Asia’s leading opium poppy and ATS producer (Emmers; 2007, 510).  
Therefore, academic discussion of this topic utilises trends and correlations rather than pure 
statistical evidence, which is either difficult to attain or skewed to present a certain 
perspective (Su; 2015, P.73).  
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As a member of ASEAN, Myanmar is part of the pledge to free the region of drug use 
by 2015. This target was recognised as insurmountable and as such, ASEAN redefined “drug 
free” to a “significant reduction in drug consumption, production, and trafficking (Kramer; 
2007, P.14)”. In addition, Myanmar has postponed their deadline to achieve this to 2019. 
With that date creeping closer, headway to successful drug reduction is far from sight. 
Instead, Myanmar has increased adoption of repressive and counter-intuitive activities 
including the eradication of opium fields, a method that has been proven to displace crops of 
local farmers and in some cases, increase levels of opium cultivation, and questionable arrests 
of drug users (Ibid; P.13).  However, the future is beginning to brighten, as Myanmar is 
looking outward internationally to understand how to best reform their outdated drug 
policies. It seems Myanmar would benefit heavily from international condemnation, from 
agencies such as the UN, of the ineffectual and counterproductive nature of ASEAN’s zero 
tolerance “drug free” deadlines, which at its core presents an unachievable target that forces 
Myanmar into rushing a process that is deeply intricate and fragile. Thus, ASEAN should 
look to create more realistic goals founded in rural development and proper rehabilitation that 
aims to enhance the quality of life of affected communities.  
In the context of ASEAN, the issue of drug trafficking was first brought to attention in 
1976 at the first ASEAN Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Bali (ASEAN; 
1976). Yet due to a lack of cooperative activity, distinct leadership, and a mainly rhetorical 
dialogue, the steps toward effective action did not take place until the late 1990’s (Emmers; 
2007, P.513). An active China and the addition of Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Laos 
into ASEAN spurred new activity, characterised by the foundation of the ASEAN and China 
Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD) in 2000 (ibid; 2007, 
P.512). ACCORD demonstrates the strongest attempt at developing a multilateral cooperative 
framework to address the issue of illicit drugs that the region has seen to date (ACCORD; 
2000). China’s motivation to become a regional leader by establishing a coherent regional 
structure has somewhat filled the leadership void that previously plagued ASEAN (ibid; 
2007, P.513). However, it can be argued that roadblocks in the form of corruption, domestic 
pressure, lack of resources and internal politics have so far delayed the prospect of an 
effective anti-drug regime under the sphere of ASEAN (ibid; 2007, P.514).   
Prior to this, efforts by ASEAN to stem the problematic drug trade had already begun. 
In 1994, the ASEAN Plan of Action on Drug Abuse Control utilised four pillars of 
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cooperative implementation; namely: treatment and rehabilitation, enforcement and 
legislation, prevention and information, and training and research, to develop ten projects 
specifically relating to the control and reduction of the illegal drug trade (ASEAN; 1994). 
Unfortunately however, these declarations never translated into reality. Without an obvious 
leader, the Philippines and Manila (who lead the initiative) were unable to apply enough 
pressure for countries such as Myanmar and Laos to act (Emmers; 2007, P.513). With this in 
mind, it is evident that prior to ACCORD, ASEAN without the leadership of China fell short 
of what it intended to achieve due to an inability to efficiently cooperate with one another at 
the multilateral level.  
When discussing the ACCORD, one aspect stands out as obvious, the commanding 
power of Chinese leadership. Without China, ASEAN’s drug reduction strategies have 
historically fallen short of expectation, with no single country arising as leader theoretically 
valuable and practical policies have fallen by the wayside. This is not to say that ACCORD 
has been successful, as it still is far from that. However, it represents a concrete mechanism 
to combat the issue of drugs with the intention of doing so through multilateral cooperation. 
When addressing its shortfalls, the primary issue is regional nations limiting their cooperation 
to national and bilateral levels, a fundamental problem that ASEAN nations must overcome 
in order to achieve the goals they plan on achieving (ibid; 2007, P.514). Arguably the biggest 
impediment to success of the ACCORD is the lack of compliance mechanisms; nations are 
not met with recourse if they do not adhere to expectation (ibid; 2007, P.514). Therefore, in 
order for ASEAN and China to successfully reduce and eventually halt the production, 
trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs in their region they must first work together 
multilaterally and second adopt mechanisms that encourage nations to act and comply with 
ACCORD’s policies.  
The non-traditional security threat of illicit drugs, particularly in relation to the 
production, trafficking, and consumption of heroin and amphetamine based substances 
(ATS), represents a pivotal issue for the countries belonging to the Golden Triangle and for 
the wider South East Asian region. Political unrest in Myanmar has fuelled the proliferation 
of this issue; scarce resources, lack of government support, and prohibitive drug policies all 
combine to constrain mechanisms for advancement toward significant reduction of illicit 
drugs. Myanmar’s continues to be the worlds second largest opium producer and is becoming 
increasingly involved in the trafficking of ATS. The Wa region in the Shan State is the 
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regions primary contributor to both drug production and trafficking. Myanmar’s shared 
border with Northern Thailand has motivated Bangkok to push for more realistic strategies to 
combat the issue; however, absence of support from ASEAN multilaterally has diminished 
the possibility of on the ground drug reduction efforts. The inclusion of China in the 
ACCORD has been beneficial, whilst the ACCORD still lacks compliance mechanisms; the 
primacy of China’s leadership has instilled newfound cooperation, albeit at this stage largely 
at the bilateral level. Moving forward, ASEAN and China must cooperate with one another 
multilaterally through ACCORD to achieve consistent and realistic drug reduction policies 
and physical implementation.  
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